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Distributional Effects of WTO Agricultural Reforms in Rich 






Rich countries’ agricultural trade policies are the battleground on which the future 
of the WTO’s troubled Doha Round will be determined. Subject to widespread criticism, 
they nonetheless appear to be almost immune to serious reform, and one of their most 
common defenses is that they protect poor farmers. Our findings reject this claim. The 
analysis conducted here uses detailed data on farm incomes to show that major 
commodity programs are highly regressive in the US, and that the only serious losses 
under trade reform are among large, wealthy, farmers in a few heavily protected sub-
sectors. In contrast, analysis using household data from 15 developing countries indicates 
that reforming rich countries’ agricultural trade policies would lift large numbers of 
developing country farm households out of poverty. In the majority of cases these gains 
are not outweighed by the poverty-increasing effects of higher food prices among other 
households. Agricultural reforms that appear feasible, even under an ambitious Doha 
Round, achieve only a fraction of the benefits for developing countries that full 
liberalization promises, but protect the wealthiest US farms from most of the rigors of 
adjustment. Finally, the analysis conducted here indicates that maximal trade-led poverty 
reductions occur when developing countries participate more fully in agricultural trade 
liberalization. 
Keywords: WTO, Poverty, Trade Liberalization, Distributional impacts of policy 
Distributional Effects of WTO Agricultural Reforms in Rich 
and Poor Countries 
 
“Trade theory is about whose hand is in whose pocket and trade policy is about who 
should take it out.” Finger (1980) 
 
 
This paper is about some well-known hands in well-known pockets but in new 
combinations and at a level of detail that has not previously been possible. For the first 
time it considers the trade-offs in global agricultural trade reform between farmers in rich 
and poor countries making use of farm-level and household-level data. It delves further 
into the distributional consequences of reform than previous research and in doing so lays 
bare some of the political economy that has made agricultural trade reform so tortured. 
  The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which is currently suspended, has an explicit mandate to improve welfare and reduce 
poverty in developing countries (WTO, 2004). The bulk of the global gains from 
merchandise trade reform derive from reforms in agriculture (Hertel and Keeney, 2006; 
Anderson and Martin, 2006), and most of these are predicted to accrue to rich countries 
as they reduce outlays on farm programs and reduce protection for agricultural products. 
But such reforms also benefit many households in developing countries – particularly 
those in the farm and rural sectors, which comprise a majority of the world’s poor – so it 
would seem that such reforms should be an easy sell to policy makers in rich and poor 
countries alike. Experience suggests the opposite, for the failure to agree on a package of 
agricultural liberalizations was the principal cause of the suspension of talks in mid-2006.   
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While agricultural reforms in industrial countries are indeed likely to benefit large 
and diffuse groups of taxpayers and consumers, they will hurt some of the farm sector – 
with the impact concentrated on some of the most powerful and well-organized interest 
groups in that sector. By contrast, farmers in developing countries — the potential 
beneficiaries of reform —  have little or no influence in the political process, while their 
urban counterparts have some interest in maintaining the status quo. 
The political economy of trade policy has long recognized the greater 
effectiveness of concentrated lobbies – see, for example, Winters (1987) or Anderson 
(1995) on agriculture – and 70 years ago Schattschneider (1936) recognized that one 
needs to evaluate such concentration at a fine level of disaggregation. Thus, in this paper 
we argue that the interesting issue in agricultural reform is not the potential global 
welfare gains, although these can be substantial (Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2006), but rather, the distribution of the benefits and costs of reform 
across households in rich and poor countries. Given the ambition of this exercise, we can 
consider only the United States among rich countries, and 15 developing countries for 
which we can assemble household survey data on income sources on a relatively uniform 
basis.  
We are very interested in the impacts of agricultural reforms previously deemed 
possible under the DDA, but to help advance the policy-making process – currently at a 
stalemate — we devote considerably attention to those reforms not currently under 
consideration. Notably, we consider greater agricultural liberalization by developing 
countries, which turns out to be pro-poor – and some compensation mechanisms which 
might reduce rich country opposition to agricultural trade reforms.   
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This analysis contains four key steps: the specification of a plausible DDA 
agreement including the translation of these into cuts in actual agricultural support; 
calculating the impacts of such reforms on global trade, prices and production; tracing 
these global impacts back to different classes of farm households within the US; and 
tracing them back to households in our focus developing countries. The combination of 
these steps into a holistic framework represents a significant contribution of this work, 
which brings together data and modeling components to conduct global scale analysis.
1  
DDA Specification:  There have been many studies of WTO trade reforms in the 
context of the DDA, but few of these bear close relationship to the actual negotiations 
undertaken in Geneva or to actual trade barriers in the world at the time the DDA will be 
implemented. In contrast, recent studies based mostly on the GTAP 6 database, recognize 
the significance of trade preferences for developing countries’ exports and also that the 
DDA will be implemented in a world in where China has acceded to the WTO and the 
EU has been enlarged (reference CEPII work here).
2 This is the approach taken here. We 
build on two recent World Bank projects which begin with tariff line data and specify 
agricultural market access scenarios based on detailed analysis of tiered formula cuts in 
current levels of tariff bindings (Anderson and Martin, 2006; Hertel and Winters, 2006). 
In cases where post-reform bindings fall below currently applied tariff levels, 
liberalization is predicted to occur. If this is not the case, no actual liberalization occurs 
despite the reduction in tariff bindings. This detailed analysis is particularly critical for 
analyzing developing countries, where bound tariffs are high and reductions in these 
                                                 
1 We also offer modest methodological advances on the previous literature in two of the four steps.  
  4
bindings are modest due to special and differential treatment. Similar detail is necessary 
for prospective reductions in domestic support (Jensen and Zobbe, 2006). 
Given a set of plausible liberalizations, we need to translate these into a set of 
changes in prices, outputs, inputs, etc. around the world. Since reforms are widespread 
sectorally and geographically, this requires a global, multi-sectoral, general equilibrium 
approach as epitomized in global computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Many 
such models have been used to analyze trade reforms, each emphasizing different 
features according to the authors’ purpose. Box 1 offers a brief introduction to the 
essential features of CGE analysis. 
Distributional Impacts for US Farm Households: US farm household population 
data are taken from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) (USDA-
ERS, 2005). This comprehensive survey of US farm households is conducted over a 
sample of around 15,000 households using economic and geographic sampling frames. 
Sampled farms include calibrated weights for aggregating the individual data into group-
wise representatives.
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Studies dated prior to 2004 typically miss these features.  
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Box 1 Computable General Equilibrium Modeling 
General equilibrium, which dates back to Leon Walras (1834-1910), is one of the crowning intellectual 
achievements of economics. It recognizes that there are many markets and that they interact in complex ways so that 
loosely speaking, everything depends on everything else. Demand for any one good depends on the prices of all other 
goods and on income. Income, in turn, depends on wages, profits, and rents, which depend on technology, factor 
supplies and production, the last of which, in its turn, depends on sales (i.e., demand). Prices depend on wages and 
profits and vice versa.  
To make such an insight useful, economists have to be able to simplify it sufficiently to derive predictions 
and conclusions. Theorists typically do this by slashing the dimensionality, say to just two goods, two factors and two 
countries, and often focusing on just a few parts of the system. An alternative approach is to keep the complex 
structure but to simplify the characterization of economic behavior and solve the whole system numerically rather 
than algebraically. This is the approach of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling. 
CGE models specify all their economic relationships in mathematical terms and put them together in a form that 
allows the model to predict the change in variables such as prices, output and economic welfare resulting from a 
change in economic policies, given information about technology (the inputs required to produce a unit of output), 
policies and consumer preferences. They do this by seeking prices at which supply equals demand in every market—
goods, factors, foreign exchange. One of the great strengths of CGE models is that they impose consistency of one’s 
view of the world, e.g., that all exports are imported by another country, that the sum of sectors’ employment does 
not exceed the labor force, or that all consumption be covered by production or imports. This consistency can often 
generate empirical insights that might otherwise be overlooked in complex policy analysis – such as the fact that 
import protection gives rise to an implicit tax on exports. 
The mathematical relationships assumed are generally rather simple, and although ‘many’ markets are 
recognized, they still have to be very aggregated—particularly for global economic analysis. For example, the global 
CGE model used in this paper has 31 sectors, so, for example, ‘transport and communications services’ appear as a 
single industry. In principle all the relationships in a model could be estimated from detailed data on the economy 
over many years. In practice, however, their number and parameterization generally outweigh the data available. In 
the model used for this paper, only the most important relationships have been econometrically estimated. These 
include the international trade elasticities (Hertel et al., 2005), the agricultural factor supply and demand elasticities 
(OECD, 2001), and consumer preferences (estimated specially for this paper, based on the methods outlined in 
Cranfield et al., and Reimer and Hertel). The remaining economic relationships are based on literature reviews, with 
a healthy dose of theory and intuition. An important limitation of CGE models is that very few of them are tested as a 
whole against historical experience—although ours is one such (Valenzuela et al., 2007, Liu et al., 2004).  
Having specified most of the relationships, the CGE modeler manipulates a subset of parameters so that the 
model will replicate detailed data for one ‘base’ year—this is known as ‘calibration.’ To calculate the effects of a 
policy change the model is solved once without the change and once with it in an otherwise identical universe and the 
difference in outcome calculated. Often the ‘without’ scenario is just the data base year, although in our case we 
project key features of the global economic policy environment economy forward to 2005 in order to facilitate our 
analysis of the Doha Round. 
In summary, CGE modeling is a very powerful tool, allowing economists to explore numerically a huge 
range of issues on which econometric estimation would be impossible; in particular to forecast the effects of future 
policy changes. The models have their limitations, however. First, CGE simulations are not unconditional predictions 
but rather ‘thought experiments’ about what the world would be like if the policy change had been operative in the 
assumed circumstances and year. The real world will doubtless have changed by the time we get there. Second, while 
CGE models are quantitative, they are not empirical in the sense of econometric modeling: they are basically 
theoretical, with limited possibilities for rigorous testing against experience. Third, conclusions about trade policy are 
very sensitive to the levels assumed for trade restrictions in the base data. One can readily do sensitivity analysis on 
the parameter values assumed for economic behavior (as we have done in this paper) but less so on the data, because 
altering one element of the base data requires compensating changes elsewhere in order to keep the national accounts 
and social accounting matrix in balance. Of course, many of these criticisms apply to other types of economic 
modeling, and therefore, while imperfect, CGE models remain the preferred tool for analysis of global trade policy 
issues.   
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These data distinguish farm households’ places in the wealth distribution, 
commodity sources of farm income, and detailed information on off-farm income so that 
changes in total income and welfare can be calculated in the wake of agricultural reforms. 
Keeney (2005) uses these data to analyze the distributional consequences of stylized 
WTO scenarios, representing the only previous analysis of US farm household impacts of 
a Doha agreement. The ARMS data have served as the source for other disaggregate 
analyses (most notably Hanson and Somwaru’s (2003) work on the WTO acceptability of 
counter-cyclical payments) but in these cases the distributional character has been 
focused on farm structure rather than the welfare focus of Keeney (2005), and global 
reforms have not been considered. 
Distributional Impacts for Poor Country Households: Winters (2002) and 
Winters et al. (2004) provide an analytical framework and evidence on tracing the effects 
of trade policy through to individual households and poverty. Hertel and Reimer (2005) 
develop this framework in the context of CGE modeling. We believe that the impact of 
trade reform on individual households will vary widely depending on their sector of 
primary employment, their endowments, and their consumption patterns. Therefore for 
each of our 15 focus developing countries we utilize household survey data to divide 
households into seven classes (strata) according to their principal income source and 
estimate factor-specific poverty elasticities for each country and stratum combination. 
These elasticities are incorporated directly into our global CGE model and embody 
information about the shape of income distribution and income sources in the 
neighborhood of the poverty line. When combined with estimates of consumption 
behavior at the poverty line, those estimates allow for accurate assessments of how  
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poverty headcounts will likely change in the wake of WTO trade reforms. Drawing on 
the results for the 15 developing countries in our sample, we seek to arrive at some 
general conclusions about the poverty impacts of trade policy reforms in rich and poor 
countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We proceed with discussion 
of the unique analytical framework created for this study’s analysis of the distributional 
impacts of WTO reforms in both rich and poor countries. Following that, we outline the 
policy scenarios to be applied in this framework. The results section begins with 
discussion of changes in macro indicators for trade, prices, and national welfare as well 
as changes in US farm household welfare and change in developing country poverty 
focusing on the impacts of agricultural reforms undertaken in rich countries. We extend 
this analysis to global reforms and non-agricultural sectors, separately identifying the 
contributions of these reforms to the poverty headcount results. The concluding section 
summarizes our findings and offers policy recommendations.  
Analytical Framework 
  Figure 1 provides an overview of the analytical framework used in this paper. The 
boxed items in the top two rows represent inputs to the framework, and the boxes at the 
bottom of the Figure represent outputs of particular relevance to this study. The other 
entries represent intermediate steps in the analysis. As can be seen, we begin with three 
fundamental sources of data: household survey data from the US, household survey data 
from the 15 focus countries, and the GTAP data base. Agricultural earnings data in the 
latter two sources are reconciled, as the GTAP data are notoriously weak when it comes  
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to the estimation of returns to self-employed labor in the farm sector (see Annex III for 
details). The reconciled survey data are used to compute the poverty elasticities discussed 
in Box 2, while the revised GTAP data are used to specify agricultural technology in the 
global CGE model. Other inputs to the global modeling exercise include: farm income 
sources by farm type for the US, the poverty headcounts, by region, for $1/day and 
$2/day, the estimated parameters for our consumer demand system, estimates of farm 
factor supply and demand elasticities from the OECD, as well as the trade reform 
scenarios (see Table 6).  These inputs are combined with a modified version of the GTAP 
CGE model of the global economy.  
With this overview in mind, a bit more needs to be said about some key aspects of 
the analytical framework. Our starting point for this analysis is the GTAP version 6.1 
data base (Dimaranan, 2006). Virtually all contemporary analyses of the Doha 
Development Agenda start at this same point. Data availability is easily the most limiting 
resource for global analysis and GTAP version 6.1 represents the only data base covering 
global economic activities with bilateral trade and protection data that reflects tariff 
preferences.  This also permits us to draw on the carefully constructed Doha reform 
scenarios developed and utilized in the recent books by Anderson and Martin (2006), and 
Hertel and Winters (2006).
3 These scenarios also involve a pre-experiment in which key 
trade policies are updated to 2005, and it is from that benchmark that the trade 
liberalization experiments proceed. 
                                                 
3 These tariff cutting scenarios are now available on the GTAP web site to those wishing to replicate this 
work. For purposes of this paper, we have used scenarios S0 (pre-simulation with China’s WTO accession, 
EU enlargement, etc.) and S8: the central Doha scenario used in the Hertel-Winters volume.  
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Our modifications to the standard GTAP model focus on features that enhance 
analysis of agricultural reforms and simulation of distributional impacts. We retain the 
simplistic yet empirically robust assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition typically featured in agricultural trade studies.
4 Our modifications are aimed 
at permitting us to shed new light on the distributional consequences of WTO reforms – 
focusing particularly on the seemingly intractable problem of agriculture liberalization in 
the industrial countries. We turn now to these modifications. 
Factor Markets: Since the work of T.W. Schultz (1945), economists have 
recognized the importance of off-farm factor mobility in determining farm incomes. 
Significant wage differentials between farm and non-farm employment persist in the 
United States and other high income economies (Gardner, 1992; Kilkenny, 1993). The 
limitations of agricultural labor markets have also been prominently featured in the 
development economics literature, as an explanation for the very low level of agricultural 
supply response (de Janvry et al., 1991). The common CGE assumption of perfect 
mobility of labor and capital from agriculture to non-agriculture forcing wages to 
equalize at each point in time for farm and non-farm workers with comparable skills, is at 
odds with historical observation.  
  Effectively modeling the complex processes leading to limited farm/non-farm, 
rural/urban mobility for the full range of countries in our model would be a lifetime 
project. Instead, we specify a constant elasticity of transformation function which 
                                                 
4 Francois et al. (2004) introduce monopolistic competition in the manufacturing sector into their analysis 
of WTO reforms. The resulting variety and scale effects generally boost the gains to rich countries and  
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“transforms” farm-labor into non-farm labor and vice-versa. This transformation function 
permits wages to diverge between the farm and non-farm sectors, a key driver for our 
distributional analysis. With segmented labor markets, the impact of reduced subsidies to 
agriculture in the rich economies will not be shared equally between the farm and non-
farm labor forces. Similarly, the benefits from higher farm prices in developing countries 
following rich country reforms will not be shared as widely with non-farm households in 
the presence of factor market segmentation.  
Much of the reasoning behind differing agricultural and non-agricultural labor 
rewards similarly applies to returns to agricultural investment. Therefore, we also 
introduce a constant elasticity of transformation function governing capital movements 
between agriculture and non-agriculture, with full capital mobility (a unique rental rate 
on capital) only applying across uses within these two broad sectors.  
The extent of burden shifting between farm and non-farm labor and capital will 
depend on the size of the associated factor supply elasticities. In order to calibrate these 
key parameters, we draw on the OECD’s (2001) parameterization of agricultural factor 
markets which derive from comprehensive econometric reviews for the EU (Salhofer, 
2001) and for North America (Abler, 2001) as well as an modeling panel’s assumptions 
for the Japanese economy.  
We assume a constant aggregate level of land, labor, and capital employment 
reflecting the belief that the aggregate supply of factors is unaffected by trade policy. 
This is not the ‘full employment’ assumption sometimes ridiculed by advocates of 
                                                                                                                                                 
dampens the gains to poor countries from rich country reforms. However, this makes their model less 
stable, and, given our focus on agricultural reforms, this feature seems less critical.   
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structuralist models of development, rather it assumes that aggregate employment is 
determined by factors such as labor market norms and regulation that are largely 
independent of trade policy in the long run. Absent sufficient detail on these employment 
drivers, we look to wage changes to clear farm and non-farm the labor markets in each 
country.
5 
  Rich Country Farm Household Impacts:  The potential for adverse impacts on 
rich country farm household incomes has received far less attention than the 
distributional impacts in poor countries, yet it represents a key component of the political 
economy of WTO trade reform. A primary factor in determining the impact of 
agricultural reforms on farm household welfare in rich countries is the share of their 
income that currently comes from the farm sector. If farm income is only 10% of total 
household income, then a 10% drop in farm income translates into just a 1% drop in 
overall household income (for constant non-farm income). Recent OECD (2003) 
statistics report the on and off-farm income split for farm households in numerous 
member countries – see Annex Table A.6.1. Farm income provides only 8% of the total 
income of US farm households and 10% and 12% in Canada and Japan respectively. In 
Europe the share is larger, in 60%-70% range. 
In the global CGE model, we model a representative farm household for each 
region and explicitly track the allocation of its labor and capital between the farm and 
non-farm sectors and the allocation of its land across agricultural uses. As returns in 
agriculture fall when subsidies are removed, farm households reallocate some farm-
                                                 
5 This market clearing assumption means that our model does not generate the large changes in 
competitiveness that Polaski finds when real wages become misaligned.  
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owned resources to the non-farm sector as well adjusting the output composition to 
changes in relative land returns. Total farm household income in the model is then 
determined as the sum of returns on their endowments employed in agriculture, plus the 
returns on those employed in non-agriculture. 
While the average farm household’s welfare change is an important component in 
assessing WTO outcomes for any given country, greater detail on the distribution around 
this average is required to develop insight into the political economy of agricultural 
reform. This requires more disaggregate data. We have obtained these data for the US, 
and we use a “micro-simulation” technique that uses the general equilibrium changes in 
product and factor prices to evaluate the welfare impact on different groups of farm 
households in this country. These different groups are defined first by their product 
specialization and then by their place in the wealth distribution of similarly specialized 
producers. The households and their initial income sourcing are benchmarked using the 
ARMS annual survey data of the United States farm household population for 2004. The 
ARMS survey data has no longitudinal component, and Hill (1996) argues that in such 
cases wealth provides a suitable substitute for multi-period averages necessary to 
accurately gauge the income position of farm households.  
Table 1 identifies the disaggregate US farm households of our study. They 
represent income specialized households in four highly protected sub-sectors: dairy, 
cotton, rice and sugar, and a residual category of non-specialized farm households. The 
specialization criterion is that at least 1/3 of farm revenue be derived from rice, cotton, or 
dairy (to be specialized in those products), and 1/5 of farm revenue from sugar (to be 
specialized in sugar). The second line of delineation among households distinguishes  
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eleven intervals in the wealth distribution of each specialization group. The farm income 
share for the specialized groups ranges from 0.22 to 0.92 with larger dependencies for 
wealthier farms. The residual category “Other”, is by far the largest in the population and 
mirrors the aggregate distribution of US farm households. Its low farm income shares 
contrast sharply with those of the specialized farms. 
 The choice of dairy, sugar, rice, and cotton as focus households is driven by the 
level of support and protection these products enjoy in the US: about 50% of total 
producer revenue for US milk, sugar and rice is attributable to farm programs (OECD 
2002) while government programs provide about 35% of revenue for cotton producers 
(Sumner, 2005). Other products like maize and oilseeds receive less support in the US 
(25%) as do livestock products (less than 5 %). In addition, maize, oilseed, and livestock 
producers in the US tend to be much more product-diversified in farm revenue. Thus, the 
focus of our analysis is squarely on those households specialized in highly protected 
products. In particular, we believe that high levels of support foster income specialization 
and specialization enhances interest group formation and lobbying around a specific 
agricultural product. Our results will provide insight into this dynamic that disfavors 
policy reforms in the most needed areas.  
Poverty Assessment:  There are many dimensions through which rich country 
reforms affect developing countries. Here we focus on the poverty headcount – that is, 
the proportion of the population that falls below the poverty line. This is the most widely 
cited figure in the literature, and, by considering two different poverty criteria ($1/day 
and $2/day), we explore the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of poverty line. We 
do this for 15 focus countries for which we have been able to assemble comparable  
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household survey data. These countries are listed in Table 2 and together they span the 
continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the aggregate, they account for nearly 1 
billion people, and more than 400 million poor  (measured at the $2/day poverty line; 150 
million  poor when evaluated at the $1/day poverty line). While they are not a random 
sample, they do span a wide range of per capita income levels as well as differing degrees 
of industrialization. Therefore, as we will see, the location and earnings patterns of the 
poor in these 15 countries vary greatly.  
There are many alternative approaches to estimating the poverty impacts of trade 
reforms (Annex II). The analytical approach used here builds on that of Hertel et al. 
(2004), which employs a sequential, macro-micro modeling strategy in which results 
from the global model are passed on to a series of micro-simulation models. In this paper 
we summarize the key characteristics of these micro-simulation models using highly 
disaggregated poverty elasticities – describing the impact of a change in various 
components of earnings on poverty within a given population group, or stratum. This 
permits us to present and analyze our results for all 15 focus countries in a compact and 
easy to understand manner while maintaining the diversity of poverty outcomes under 
global trade reform.  
A key finding in the work of Hertel et al. (2004) is the importance of stratifying 
households by their primary source of income. Unlike some of the rich countries (and 
particularly the US, as discussed above), farm households in developing countries often 
rely on the farm enterprise for virtually all of their income and are likely to be highly 
diversified in the products grown on the farm. Furthermore, the share of national poverty  
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concentrated in agriculture-specialized households is quite high in the poorest countries 
in our sample – between one-quarter and one-half of the $1/day headcount in Chile, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. On the other hand, this share is 
relatively small in Mexico, Peru and Thailand, where a much smaller proportion of the 
households are engaged in farming, as well as Vietnam, where rural households are  more 
likely to have substantial off-farm income.  
Not only are farm households in the poorest countries more likely to be 
specialized in farming, these specialized farm households also tend to be poorer, on 
average, than the rest of the population. This point is evident from Figure 2 which plots 
the poverty headcount in the entire population (horizontal axis) against the poverty rate in 
the agriculture-specialized group (vertical axis). With the exception of Peru, Mexico and 
Venezuela, which lie slightly below the 45 degree-line, it is clear that agriculture 
specialized households have a higher poverty rate – indeed, in the case of Brazil, this is 
about six times the national poverty rate. The implication of this pattern of farm income 
specialization is that the poorest households in the poorest countries are more 
concentrated on agriculture and therefore more likely to benefit from producer price 
increases engendered by multilateral trade reforms.  
We follow Hertel et al. (2004) in identifying five household groups that rely 
almost exclusively (95% or more) on one source of income: agricultural self 
employment, non-agricultural self-employment, rural wage labor, urban wage labor, or 
transfer payments. The remaining households are grouped into rural and urban diversified 
strata, leading to seven total strata. Table 2 reports the share of the total national poverty  
  16
headcount ($1/day) arising in each stratum, for each of our 15 focus countries. 
Agriculture specialized households and rural diversified households tend to dominate the 
poverty headcount, although exceptions are Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, where self-
employed, non-agriculture households contain a large share of the poor. 
The change in the national poverty rate is calculated from the changes in the 
poverty headcount in each stratum, The latter depend on the density of the income 
distribution in the neighborhood of the poverty line. This can be usefully captured by the 
stratum-specific poverty elasticities which have been computed numerically based on the 
cumulative income distribution taken from the household survey data for each of the 
focus countries (Box 2). These are reported in Table 3, and they answer the question: If 
incomes in a given stratum rise by one percent, what percentage reduction in the poverty 
headcount will be achieved? They range from a low of 0.0006 in the self-employed 
agriculture stratum in Zambia, where nearly all of the population is well below the 
poverty line, to a high of 3.63 in the urban diversified stratum of Brazil, where the 
population density at the poverty line is quite high.  
However, all income sources are not equally important for households in poverty. 
In most cases these households own few assets, and have few skills, so their primary 
endowment is unskilled labor. Increased returns to capital in the wake of trade reforms 
will do little to reduce poverty. However, a rise in the unskilled wage will make a great 
deal of difference. This fact is captured in our work by disaggregating the poverty 
elasticities by income source, as shown in Table 4 for the case of Peru. These elasticities 
measure the percentage change in stratum poverty headcount, in response to a one 
percent increase in returns to different types of household endowments.  
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Box 2.  Estimating Poverty Impacts in the Focus Countries 
The unifying theme of our results is that different households are affected differently by trade reforms. Thus 
how we derive and treat differences among households is central to the analysis. The most consistent approach embeds 
household behavior fully within the national CGE model, but this is computationally burdensome (Rutherford, Tarr and 
Shepotylo, 2006) and would add significant complexity to an already complex global analysis. A popular simplification 
involves solving a national CGE model and combining the resulting changes in commodity prices, factor prices and 
possibly quantities and employments with household data on earnings and expenditures to estimate a (first-order) 
approximation of the welfare effects on households. Chen and Ravallion (2004) apply this to 80,000 households to 
estimate the poverty effects of Chinese accession to the WTO. Hertel and Winters (2006) is conceptually similar in its 
estimates of the poverty implications of the Doha Round, but with up to three levels of modeling: a global multi-country 
CGE model to calculate the effects of the Round on each country’s prices of imports and export demand; more detailed 
national CGE models for twelve country case studies to estimate the effects of these on local prices etc, and, in the cases 
where the national models do not embed households directly, household modules to calculate the first order welfare 
approximations by household.  
A further simplification is again to solve a CGE model with a single representative consumer, but now to 
consider the effects of a shock only on a few summary statistics such as average incomes, unskilled wages and food 
prices. Then, applying ‘poverty elasticities’ to these statistics allows one to estimate the implied change in poverty. (The 
poverty elasticity relates the proportionate change in poverty to the proportionate change in per capita GDP – see, for 
example, Ravallion (1997)). This is the approach in Cline (2004), and Anderson et al. (2006) among others. These 
studies differ inter alia in the base poverty levels to which they apply the elasticities. 
For purposes of this paper, we adopt a hybrid of the alternatives. For a global model of the size we have used to 
explore the DDA, it is not computationally feasible to embed households or even many representative household groups 
into the CGE model. And neither do we have the requisite data on factor earnings by household for the majority of 
developing countries. However, we believe that the impact of trade reform on individual households will vary widely 
depending on their primary sector of employment, their endowments, as well as their consumption patterns. Therefore 
we reject the single poverty elasticity approach. Instead we utilize the factor earnings and income distribution data for 
our 15 target developing countries, where this has been obtained and processed in a uniform manner, and we estimate 
country-stratum-factor price-poverty line specific poverty elasticities. These elasticities embody information about the 
shape of the income distribution as well as the composition of household earnings in the neighborhood of the poverty 
line for key subgroups (strata) of the population.  
The specifics of our approach are as follows: For each of our 15 countries we have household surveys that 
identify sources of income. As described in the Annex, we first adjust the earnings data in order to ensure that the 
composition of factor incomes in agriculture match those reported in the National Accounts. (A comprehensive 
reconciliation of these two, mutually inconsistent, sources of income would be a monumental, so we focus on the sector 
most central to our analysis, which also happens to be the easiest to reconcile.) We then divide households into seven 
strata, or groups of households, according to their predominant source of income and location: for five the criterion is 
that 95% or more of income comes from the named source—agricultural self-employment, non-agricultural self-
employment, urban wages, rural wages, and transfers; for the remaining two we distinguish urban diversified and rural 
diversified. Each stratum is then ordered by total income and divided into twenty vigntiles to create a total of 140 
classes of households in each of the 15 focus countries.  
For each stratum we calculate poverty elasticities with respect to each source of income, where the shares of 
income come from the vigntiles in which the poverty line falls, and the density of households around the poverty line 
from the overall distribution. The density determines the change in headcount poverty resulting from a given change in 
stratum income, while the earnings shares determine how a change in (e.g.) unskilled wages change stratum income in 
the neighborhood of the poverty line. Once the CGE model has been solved for a new set of factor prices, we can use 
these poverty elasticities to determine the change in stratum poverty – and, given the relative importance of stratum 
poverty in national poverty – the change in the latter may also be obtained. 
Of course, a rise in factor earnings is only meaningful from a poverty perspective if commodity prices do not 
also rise by the same amount. Therefore we must deflate the factor price changes by the change in the real cost of living 
at the poverty line. This is obtained by solving the AIDADS demand system for the expenditure necessary to achieve 
the poverty level of utility at the post-reform prices.  
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So, for example, from the first entry in row 2 of Table 4, we see that a one percent 
increase in unskilled wages in Peruvian agriculture reduces the $1/day poverty headcount 
in the agriculture stratum by 1.41%. It also contributes to poverty reductions in the 
diversified households. Indeed, the elasticity is slightly higher for urban diversified 
households than for rural diversified ones, indicating that these households earn a non-
negligible share of their income from agriculture self-employment, despite their urban 
status in the survey.  Labor income is also dominant in the other strata, although in the 
case of non-agriculture, it is non-agricultural labor, and so on. Note also that the non-
agriculture and wage-labor specialized households receive income from both skilled and 
unskilled labor.  
Returning to the agriculture stratum poverty elasticities in the first column of 
Table 4, we see that, in addition to unskilled labor, there are also small elasticities for 
land, agriculture capital and transfers. If returns to all of these income sources were to 
rise by one percent, then stratum income would rise by one percent for all households, 
including the households at the poverty line. Therefore, the elasticities in Table 4 sum to 
the same figure displayed in Table 3 for this particular stratum (compare row total with 
Peru row in Table 3).  
As noted in Table 2, in addition to the agriculture stratum, the rural diversified 
stratum is a very important repository for the poor in most of our focus countries. For this 
reason, it is interesting to examine the poverty elasticities for this particular stratum 
across the full range of focus countries. These are reported in Table 5. To facilitate 
comparison across countries, we have normalized these elasticities, by dividing by their 
total (e.g., 1.05 for the rural diversified households in Peru, Table 4). So the elements in  
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each row represent the contribution of each endowment to the total poverty elasticity for 
the rural diversified stratum in a given country. Clearly the composition of the aggregate 
poverty elasticity for the rural diversified stratum varies considerably across countries –
further evidence of the great variety of developing countries included in our sample.  
As expected, unskilled earnings are generally dominant in the rural diversified 
households’ earnings profile, with the type of earnings depending on the sector in which 
the labor is employed. Land rents are generally unimportant for the poor, excepting in the 
case of the Philippines, and, to a lesser degree, Uganda. Skilled labor also plays a small 
role in earnings at the poverty line in these countries, and hence contributes little to the 
poverty elasticities. Agriculture and non-agriculture capital plays a more important role in 
some countries – most notably non-agriculture capital in Vietnam, where it accounts for 
more than half of the poverty elasticity for the rural diversified households. Transfer 
payments are quite significant at the poverty line in the wealthier countries – most 
notably Brazil, Chile and Thailand, where they account for more than a third of the total 
poverty elasticity for the rural diversified households.  
The income sources in Table 5 must be mapped to factor earnings in the general 
equilibrium model. For example, agricultural labor and capital receive the corresponding 
farm factor returns from the general equilibrium model, as do non-agricultural labor and 
capital. Wage labor reported in the survey presents a problem, since we don’t know how 
much of this is employed in agriculture vs. non-agriculture activities. For this reason, we 
simply assign to it the economy-wide average wage – a blend of the farm and non-farm 
wages. Finally, transfer payments are indexed by the growth rate in net national income 
(Annex V offers elaboration on this choice).   
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Of course our evaluation of household welfare depends not only on earnings, but 
also on what happens to consumer prices. With food prices likely to rise in the wake of 
rich country agricultural reforms, and with the poorest households potentially spending 
the bulk of their income on food, this could have adverse consequences for poverty. 
Therefore, we turn next to our treatment of consumer preferences.  
Household Preferences and Welfare:  Given the emphasis in this paper on 
household welfare – in both rich and poor countries – it is important that we pay close 
attention to the specification of household preferences and the resulting pattern of 
demands across the income spectrum. The approach used here follows closely that of 
Hertel et al. (2004) insofar as we begin with an econometrically estimated, international, 
cross-section demand system, which is then systematically adjusted to reproduce national 
per capita demands. These national preferences are then used to predict demands across 
the income spectrum within each country; in particular they are used to assess the impact 
of consumer price changes on households at the poverty line in our 15 focus countries. In 
the US, the national demand system is used to evaluate welfare for each of the farm 
household groups discussed above.  
The demand system chosen for this task must be flexible enough to explain the 
broad pattern of consumption in Malawi, on the one hand, and the United States on the 
other. Accordingly, we follow Hertel et al.(2004) in using a demand system – nick-named 
AIDADS — which features highly non-linear Engel curves and has been shown to 
perform very well in out-of-sample predictions of per capita international demand 
behavior (Cranfield et al., 2003; see Annex IV for a detailed discussion). For our 
purposes, the key feature is that the chosen demand system allocates two-thirds of its  
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parameters to predicting behavior at extremely low income levels, which is what we need 
to predict the consumption impacts on the poor. Estimation of this demand system is 
undertaken using the 80-country, per capita consumption data set offered by GTAP, 
version 6.1 and the resulting parameters are reported in Annex IV.  
  The best way to understand the implications of this approach to estimation of 
demands across the income spectrum is to view the results for a particular country. Figure 
3 plots the predicted household budget shares for Peru, across the income spectrum. 
These show how the pattern of consumer expenditures are predicted to vary from the 
subsistence level (origin of horizontal axis), where expenditures on food and clothing are 
dominant (budget share of nearly 60%), to the national per capita expenditure level where 
the household budget is more diversified (the horizontal axis reports the natural logarithm 
of consumption expenditure, per capita). Vertical lines denote the $1/day, $2/day and 
national per capita expenditure levels. Note that at $1/day poverty line, 49% of the budget 
is devoted to food, with the bulk of this spent on crops. The initial levels of utility at the 
two poverty lines are each fixed, and the estimated demand system is used to determine 
the change in the cost of attaining this exogenous poverty level of utility when prices and 
demands change due to trade liberalization.   
Policy Scenarios 
Our attention in this paper is on the distributional impacts of WTO reforms in 
agriculture. Since such reforms are most contentious in the rich countries, we focus 
initially on impacts from liberalizing agricultural policies in only the rich countries. The 
OECD produces annual estimates of the producer support estimate for its member 
countries. Rice is far and away the most protected commodity by this measure, with on  
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average OECD rice producers receiving eighty-plus percent of their revenue as a result of 
some policy intervention. Both sugar and milk producers in the OECD generate over 
forty percent of their revenue from some combination of market intervention and direct 
government support, while other grains and oilseeds lie below that level. 
Across countries, the producer support for OECD member countries varies widely 
ranging from a low value of 1 percent of producer revenue in New Zealand to a high 
value of 69 percent of producer revenue in Switzerland (Annex Table A.6.2). For the 
OECD in aggregate, transfers to producers account for 31 percent of revenues. Producer 
support in the EU is near the OECD-wide average. In Western Europe and East Asia 
producer support is considerably above the OECD average, while that in North America 
and Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat below. Australia and New Zealand provide 
minimal support to producers through agricultural policies.  
The OECD producer support estimate is a combined measure of all support to 
producers capturing the transfer of treasury monies paid to farmers as well as the 
transfers from commodity transactions to producers resulting from prices supported 
above world price levels. Thus this subsidy measure can be broadly decomposed into 
market price support (i.e. policy measures applied at a country’s border) and farm policy 
transfers including output and input subsidies, area and headage based payments, and the 
various payments tied to land use, farm income, and historical payments. The relative 
importance of these differs across countries but in most instances the division between 
market price and other support is roughly equal. The primary exception is in East Asia 
(Japan and Korea) where producer support is nearly all provided as market price support.   
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The WTO separates support policies into three groups, with separate negotiating 
modalities for each of them. Translating from the OECD producer support measure to the 
WTO’s aggregate measure of support framework is not straightforward. The market price 
support component captures both the market access and export subsidy pillars of the 
WTO agricultural negotiations. The remaining portion of the OECD measure poses a 
significant challenge for quantifications in the context of the WTO domestic support 
negotiations, as these are differentiated according to “traffic light” designations (amber, 
blue, and green boxes) that intend to characterize the level of distortion created by a 
particular policy implementation. This complexity of moving from the OECD’s 
comprehensive domestic support data base to the WTO domestic support framework is 
the reason we draw on the published study by Jensen and Zobbe (2006) for our Doha 
agricultural scenarios. These authors consider in detail not only the WTO designations of 
support, but also the associated binding overhang versus actual support levels that we can 
not evaluate by looking at the OECD producer support estimates in isolation.  
The Doha scenario considered in this paper derives from the so-called July 2004 
Framework Agreement (WTO, 2004) as embodied in the core scenario from the Hertel 
and Winters volume (2006) and is summarized, along with the other policy scenarios 
considered in this paper, in Table 6. The first column of this table highlights the 
implications for cuts in support in the rich countries’ agricultural sectors – the main focus 
of this paper. This Doha scenario assumes that industrial countries with domestic support 
in excess of 20 percent of production cut their bound commitments by 75 percent, while 
others cut by 60 percent. However, even with these ambitious reductions, the gap 
between bindings and applied policies, as well as the inclusion of market price support  
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concepts mean that effectively only five WTO members would be required to reduce 
actual support, based on 2001 notifications: Australia, EU, Iceland, Norway, and US 
(Jensen and Zobbe, 2006). Export subsidies are the one area where bold cuts (full 
elimination) are on the table, and we assume this outcome in our Doha scenario. When it 
comes to developing countries (see column three) domestic subsidy bindings are cut by 
40 percent. In this case, Jensen and Zobbe (2006) estimate that only Thailand’s subsidies 
would be affected. 
Agricultural tariffs in the rich countries are reduced using a tiered formula, with 
marginal cuts changing at 15 and 90 percent bound tariff rates. The marginal cuts are 45 
percent on the first 15 percentage points of the tariff, 70 percent for the range between 15 
and 90 percent, and 75 percent on the remainder.
6 For developing countries, the inflection 
points are placed at 20, 60 and 120 percent bound tariff levels in agriculture, with 
marginal cuts of 35, 40, 50 and 60 percent, respectively.  
  Of course, cross-sector trade-offs are at the heart of the WTO negotiations, so we 
also consider the impact of non-agricultural elements of a prospective Doha Development 
Agenda on both rich and poor countries. Given the importance of non-agricultural 
income to farm households in many of the rich countries, this also could have a direct 
bearing on farm household welfare. In the case of poverty impacts in developing 
countries, improved access to rich country manufactures markets, as well as access to the 
markets of other developing countries can have an important impact on the demand for 
unskilled labor, and hence poverty rates.  
                                                 
6 For example, a tariff of, say, 100% is cut by 66.95%: = [15%*0.45 + (90-15)%*0.70 + (100-90)%*0.75]. 
By applying the cuts at the margin we avoid the discontinuities implied by the July Framework.  
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Following Hertel and Winters (2006), we focus the attention of our non-
agricultural shocks on market access (see column 3 of Table 6), since barriers to services 
trade and investment remain difficult to quantify and those WTO negotiations appear 
unlikely to yield significant changes in the near term. Specifically, non-agriculture tariffs 
are subjected to proportional cuts of 50 percent for developed and 33 percent for 
developing countries. The Least Developed Countries are not required to cut tariffs under 
this central scenario (see Anderson and Martin, 2006).  As a consequence of these 
relatively ambitious tariff cuts in both farm and non-farm trade, average world-wide 
tariffs for all merchandise trade drop from 4.7% in the baseline to 3.2%. 
In order to establish a benchmark set of liberalization results from which to make 
comparisons, we begin by examining the distributional consequences of the complete 
elimination of rich country support for agriculture. We then consider the portion of this 
impact that would be delivered under the particular Doha scenario discussed above. After 
this, we add, in turn,  non-agricultural reforms in the rich countries, and liberalization in 
the developing countries (agricultural and non-agricultural).  
Finally, we consider the likely scenario that governments in rich regions will opt 
to compensate adversely affected farm households through WTO green-box means. 
These green-box payments are tied to land use, not output, and are designed to be neutral 
across farm products (i.e. the subsidy is not contingent of a specific use of the land). As 
such they generate minimal distortions in world markets and so are in line with WTO 
guidelines as their primary effect is simply the transfer of income from taxpayers 
(including farmers) to farmers.   
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Throughout our analysis, we employ a macroeconomic closure which fixes the 
ratios of government spending, tax revenue, net national savings, and the trade balance, 
all relative to net national income. This (relatively standard) closure facilitates linking the 
aggregate and disaggregate welfare impacts of trade reform (see the Annex for an 
extended discussion of our closure assumptions and their implications). 
Results 
Agriculture Liberalization by the Rich Economies:  Before discussing the farm 
household impacts, we consider briefly the macro-economic impacts of these policies. 
Complete liberalization of rich country farm policies generates some very large trade 
volume increases for rice, sugar and beef products where border protection is dominant, 
whereas world trade in  coarse grains and cotton actually falls, as domestic subsidies are 
eliminated and rich country exports are reduced. Under the Doha scenario, which 
emphasizes trade volume-reducing export subsidy elimination, as opposed to trade-
increasing tariff reductions, the global trade volumes for wheat and dairy products also 
fall. Details are available in Annex Table A.6.3. 
We turn next to the national, macro-economic impacts of the reforms. Table 7 
reports two key national indicators for the rich countries and our 15 focus developing 
countries (results for other regions are reported in the annex). These variables are: the 
percentage change in the regional terms of trade (an index of export prices, relative to 
import prices), and the percentage change in real aggregate consumption (national 
welfare derived from the consumption of private goods and services). We see from the 
first two pairs of columns (Rich-Agr-Full and Rich-Agr-Doha), that agricultural 
liberalization is good for the rich countries (welfare rises). Furthermore, these changes  
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are statistically significant, once we take into account the parametric uncertainty 
associated with our CGE model. (See the footnote to Table 7 as well as Annex I.) The 
fact that reform of this highly distorted sector will benefit the rich countries should come 
as little surprise, and it is well-established in the literature (Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2006; Francois et al., 2005; Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney, 2004). The 
roadblock to agricultural reform has to do with the concentration of losses among key 
interest groups – a point to which we will turn shortly. Note also that the Doha reforms 
capture a significant share of total available gains to Europe under full agricultural 
reform, and a little under half in other rich countries. 
  A somewhat more controversial point has to do with the impact of rich country 
agricultural reforms on the developing countries. Here, the key mechanism for 
transmission for economic welfare is through the terms of trade (ToT). If a country is a 
net importer of food products and the world price of food products rises, then the ToT 
might be expected to deteriorate. This is the case of Bangladesh, for example, which, 
according to Table 7, experiences a 0.58% ToT deterioration under Rich-Agr-Full 
liberalization, and a 0.21% ToT decline under the Rich-Agr-Doha scenario. This is 
primarily due to higher prices for cotton, wheat and oilseeds. With a deteriorating ToT, 
Bangladesh can afford fewer imports for a given amount of exports, and real 
consumption is expected to decline. On the other hand, Brazil, with a 5.48% ToT 
appreciation, can now consume more imports, or export less and consume more domestic 
production, so its welfare rises.  
Of course, the story is a bit more complex for two reasons. First of all, in a world 
of differentiated products, there is no single “world price” for a good. Even a commodity  
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like rice is differentiated and many different prices can co-exist in the world market at 
one point in time. So it can matter whether you source your rice from a country whose 
price is rising, for example due to the elimination of an export subsidy. This is the case 
with dairy imports into Venezuela from the EU and US. Venezuela also suffers from 
higher import prices for manufactures from Brazil, since the latter country experiences a 
real appreciation. In short, Venezuela is an example of a country that experiences ToT 
and consumption losses due to its specific pattern of imports. (A full decomposition of 
the ToT results is available in Annex Table A.6.5.) Overall, we find that the ToT 
deteriorate in 7 of the 15 focus countries in the case of full agricultural reform in the rich 
countries, with the number being somewhat larger (9 of 15) in the case of the Doha 
reforms. The latter result follows from the greater emphasis of Doha on export subsidies 
as opposed to market access.  
The second complication to the simple “ToT drive welfare” story described above 
arises due to the presence of domestic tax and subsidy distortions. Note in particular, that 
in the case of the Philippines and Tanzania (Rich-Agr-Full) and Peru (Rich-Agr-Doha), 
the ToT improve, but welfare falls. This stems from fact that all three countries have 
domestic tax policies that favor agriculture, relative to industry. Therefore an expansion 
of agriculture at the expense of industry has an adverse effect on economic efficiency and 
overall welfare.  
Now let us turn to the distributional results of rich country agricultural reforms. 
Table 8 reports the percentage change in real on-farm income and off-farm household 
income, as well as the implied change in real household income for the aggregate farm 
household in each of the rich economies. From the on-farm income results, it is clear why  
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there is so much opposition to these reforms. The average decline in Japan is 16 % under 
the Doha scenario and 28 % under the Full Liberalization scenario and 6% and 13% 
respectively in the EU. On-farm income losses in the US are much smaller – indeed they 
are negligible under the Doha scenario, while Canadian and Australia/New Zealand 
producers see gains in real on-farm income.  
  However, as noted above, farm households in many of these countries are quite 
diversified in their earnings. If we factor in the change in real, off-farm income, which 
tends to rise (albeit modestly, since there are no reforms outside of agriculture), the total 
impact on real farm household income is considerably moderated. Indeed, in Japan, the 
losses drop by a full order of magnitude – from -16 % to just -1.4 % under the Doha 
scenario. In the US, the losses become negligible, even under full liberalization. The 
dampening factor is less prevalent in Europe, where the role of off-farm income is much 
more modest than in Japan and US. 
  Given the very modest aggregate farm household losses in the US, the question 
arises: Why is the opposition to reform so strong? This becomes quite clear when we 
delve more deeply into the US impacts, using the farm household survey data and 
associated methodology outlined above. Table 9 reports the welfare impacts on 
representative households in each of the 11 wealth classes across the five US producer 
groups. It is clear that under the Rich-Agr Full Liberalization scenario, the losses to the 
richest, and likely most influential, producer groups are very large– nearly 20% of 
income in the case of the wealthiest rice producers. The wealthiest sugar producers are 
also hard-hit, as are cotton producers across the board. The surprising thing about the 
results in Table 9 is the impact on rice producers under the Doha scenario. Here, they  
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switch from being the biggest losers to the biggest gainers (based on this 5-way producer 
grouping)!  
  To further investigate this result we have performed a decomposition (using the 
methodology of Harrison, Horridge and Pearson, 1999) that separately identifies the 
partial impact of US rice reforms, US non-rice reforms, Japanese rice reforms, and the 
residual category of all other agricultural reforms on US Farm Household welfare. 
Results (available in annex Table A.6.6) show that the US agricultural reforms contribute 
negatively to rice producer welfare. The initial level of support for rice production is very 
high and even the modest reduction of the Doha scenario would generate an average real 
income loss of -4.5% for rice producers if applied in isolation. Other US agricultural 
reforms have lower but significant impact (-2% average income change) since rice 
households lose support on any other crops they might produce and non-rice reforms 
lower returns to labor and capital in agriculture. Therefore, the positive Doha welfare 
impact derives from non-US policy reforms.  
The US rice producer gains under Rich-Agr reforms are dominated by the gains 
owing to increased access to the lucrative Japanese market. Japanese rice protection cuts 
increases average rice producer welfare by 8 percent, with the average contribution of 
other countries liberalizing adding an additional one percent. So US producers gain under 
Rich country reforms, following the Doha Agenda, since their cuts in domestic support 
are modest (28%), while the improvement in market access to Japan is substantial. Of 
course, Japanese negotiators will strive to have rice treated as a sensitive product, thereby  
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limiting the increase in market access, and this will obviously limit the final gains under 
any agreement.
7   
  Having considered the impact of rich country agricultural reforms on farm 
households in the rich economies, we now turn to the impact of these reforms on the 
poorest farm households in the some of the poorest countries in the world. As noted 
previously, we do this via a set of disaggregated poverty elasticities — each of which 
relates to one of the income sources for the poor. We focus our analysis on the Rich-Agr-
Full liberalization results, subsequently comparing these to the Doha impacts. 
  Table 10 reports the change in cost-of-living deflated factor returns, by country 
under the $1/day poverty line assumption. With the exception of Uganda, which is the 
only focus country to experience a real depreciation in the face of rich country 
agricultural liberalization,
8 these returns rise for all agricultural factors in all regions – a 
simple consequence of the higher world prices for farm products. The biggest increases 
are in land prices (the least mobile factor of production) – with very substantial increases 
(from 15 – 39%) in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Thailand. This is followed by unskilled 
agricultural labor and capital. Note that the poverty-deflated earnings fall for 
nonagricultural labor and capital in most countries. This will translate into higher poverty 
rates for the self-employed, non-agriculture households. However, the economy-wide 
average wage for unskilled labor rises in Brazil, Chile, Malawi, Peru, Philippines, 
                                                 
7 Anderson and Martin (2005) provide a systematic analysis of the case in which sensitive and special 
commodities are exempted from steep tariff cuts, facing instead a modest 15% cut in bound rates (the Doha 
scenario considered in this paper). In the case where just 2% of industrial country tariff lines and 4% of 
developing country tariff lines in agriculture are exempted, the overall average tariff cuts are greatly 
reduced. Furthermore, Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) find that such exemptions erase 
any potential for poverty reduction under our Doha scenario.  
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Thailand and Vietnam, so that modest poverty reductions in the wage-labor households 
are expected. The final column of Table 10 shows that transfers, which are assumed to be 
indexed by net national income, generally do not rise fast enough to offset the higher cost 
of living at the poverty line. So we expect poverty in the transfer strata to rise. 
  Table 11 reports the consequent changes in $1/day poverty, by stratum. As 
expected, poverty rates in the agriculture stratum fall in all countries, excepting Uganda. 
Due to its relatively higher poverty elasticities, the largest percentage reductions in 
poverty are in Thailand. However, there are also double-digit percentage reductions in 
poverty among the self-employed agricultural households in Brazil, Chile, and Peru. 
Clearly the same policies that bolster incomes of the richest farm households in US, and 
other developed countries, have an adverse impact on the poorest farm households in 
some of the poorest countries in the world. The removal of these policies serves to reduce 
poverty incidence among poor country farm households. The diversified household strata 
(both urban and rural) also show substantial poverty reductions in a number of cases – 
particularly Brazil, Chile and Thailand. On the other hand, higher food prices consistently 
push more of the non-agriculture, self-employed and the transfer dependent households 
into poverty.  
The net effect of Rich-Agr Liberalization on the national poverty headcount is 
reported in the first set of columns in Table 12. National poverty at the $1/day level falls 
in 10 of the 15 countries, with small percentage increases in Mozambique (unskilled 
wages fall), Uganda (factor prices fall), Venezuela (high share of poor in the non-
                                                                                                                                                 
8 In the case of Uganda, the impact of preference erosion in the EU market is particularly severe.  
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agriculture stratum), Vietnam (large poverty elasticity for non-agricultural capital) and 
Zambia (negligible poverty elasticity in agriculture stratum). The next column of Table 
12 converts these percentage changes into thousands of people. Here, the reductions in 
Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand are clearly dominant. When we move to the 
$2/day of Rich-Agr Lib (next two columns of the table), the national poverty picture is 
reversed in two cases: Bangladesh (small decrease becomes a small increase) and 
Vietnam (small insignificant increase becomes a small decrease), so once again poverty 
falls in two-thirds of the 15 countries. On balance, the largest changes involve poverty 
reductions, with Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand standing out.  
We can contrast these outcomes to those that would be achieved under the 
prospective DDA (Rich-Agr reforms only), and this is done in the final four columns of 
Table 12. More modest rises in agriculture earnings and lesser increases in the unskilled 
wage rate (adjusted for the cost of living at the poverty line) means that now poverty rises 
(albeit slightly) in more than half the countries (8 of 15) in the case of $1/day poverty. 
Clearly even the ambitious Doha Development Agenda under examination here is less 
poverty friendly than would be a proportionately scaled back version of full liberalization 
in rich country agriculture. The latter would presumably show poverty reduction in all the 
same countries – just to a lesser degree. Yet the Doha scenario results in fewer countries 
showing poverty reductions than under the full liberalization of Rich Agriculture.  
  Global Liberalization Scenarios: We now turn to a set of liberalization scenarios 
that involve tariff cuts in both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors and in both the rich 
and the poor countries. Developing country agricultural tariffs are quite high, so 
abolishing them increases world agricultural trade volumes relative to rich-only  
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liberalization. Reforming them on Doha terms, however, makes little difference because 
the large binding overhangs and modest cuts in developing country bound tariffs (no cuts 
for LDCs) translate into little additional market access. Adding tariff cuts in 
manufactures on the other hand leads to significant increases in manufacturing trade 
under both full and Doha scenarios and for both developed and developing countries (see 
Annex table A.6.3 for detailed results).  
Returning to Table 7, we consider now the second group of columns reporting the 
aggregate welfare and terms of trade impacts of the global reforms. Comparing Rich 
Agriculture with Global reforms, the most striking change in the rich countries is the 
improvement in the terms of trade for Japan, which benefits from manufacturing tariff 
cuts. On the other hand, the Canadian terms of trade deteriorate more as a result of 
preference erosion in the US manufactures market. However, despite this terms of trade 
loss, Canadian welfare rises by more under global full liberalization than under Rich-Agr 
liberalization alone.  
  Turning to the focus countries, we see very different terms of trade and welfare 
impacts than those stemming from Rich Agriculture reforms only. The terms of trade for 
these developing countries fall in more cases (9 of 15 cases), due to the expansion of poor 
country exports in the wake of own and other developing country tariff cuts and the 
erosion of preferences in manufacturing. However, welfare only falls for six of these 
countries, with efficiency gains dominating the ToT losses in the other three cases 
(Philippines, Vietnam and Zambia). In contrast, under Global Doha, there are fewer ToT 
losses, but also fewer (and smaller) welfare gains. These mixed aggregate welfare effects 
for developing countries from global trade reforms are quite comparable to those reported  
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in other studies of the aggregate impacts of global trade reforms on developing countries 
(Francois et al., Anderson and Martin, Hertel and Winters).  
The changes in real farm income under global reforms (Annex Table A.6.7) – 
both full liberalization and Doha reforms – are dominated by the Rich-Agr reforms 
previously discussed. Liberalizing rich country non-agricultural merchandise trade is 
slightly beneficial to the farm households – by lowering the price of non-agricultural 
goods, but tariffs on most of these products are already quite low and so the impact is 
minimal. On the other hand, trade reforms in the poor countries as a group tend to be 
slightly adverse for the welfare of rich country farm households. This is due to a complex 
set of factors, including the tendency for tariff cuts to encourage labor and capital to shift 
back to the food and agriculture sector, as well as the impact of increased demand on the 
general price level in rich countries. But these effects are very small, relative to the 
primary impact of the Rich-Agr policies themselves.  
Given these results for the average farm household in the rich countries, it is 
hardly surprising that the impacts of global reforms on individual US farm households  
are quite similar to that reported previously in the Rich-Agr reform scenario (Table 
A.6.8). Welfare for the wealthiest farm households is driven first and foremost by their 
own national policies, with the largest international interactions occurring among the 
world’s richest (and largest) markets – as in the case of US-Japan rice trade. 
However, when it comes to the poverty impacts of global trade reform, 
agricultural policies in the rich countries are only part of the story – trade policies in the 
developing countries themselves assume much greater prominence. Table 13 reports the 
impacts of global trade reform on national poverty in our 15 focus countries. We  
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decompose these effects by the broad set of policies being reformed using the technique 
of Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson (1999). As noted previously, Rich-Agr reforms 
contribute to poverty reduction in the majority of countries. However the most striking 
thing about the results in Table 13 is the uniformly favorable impact of food and 
agriculture tariff cuts in the poor countries on poverty (column Poor-Agr). The impact of 
non-agriculture reforms in both rich and poor countries is generally of lesser magnitude, 
and mixed in sign.  
Table 14 provides a comprehensive picture of the poverty impacts of global 
reforms, including those implied by the Doha scenario. Here, we see that the latter is 
indeed less poverty friendly than the global liberalization scenario, with poverty rising in 
8 of the 15 countries, as opposed to just 6 in the full liberalization case. Hertel and Ivanic 
(2006) emphasize that this is due to the heavy weight given to export subsidy elimination 
(which raises import prices for food), while the developing countries make only mild cuts 
to their applied tariffs under the Doha scenario and the least developed countries are not 
required to cut tariffs at all. 
Compensation for Rich Country Farmers: The farm household welfare impacts in 
rich countries are dominated by liberalization of the agricultural pillars. Inclusion of 
agricultural and developing country reforms do little to make-up the lost income when we 
broaden the scope of reform. With this in mind we consider a final scenario that ensures 
that aggregate farm income is left unchanged under the global full liberalization 
experiment. This requires solving for an endogenous green-box subsidy to land in the 
following rich regions where aggregate farm income declines: Japan (-28.4%), Europe 
(-11.5%), and the US (-3.7%). The choice of aggregate farm income as a compensation  
  37
target reflects the expectation that the policy process will continue to focus on this readily 
available measure to gauge the well-being of the farm population. In an alternative 
compensation simulation we investigate the cost savings generated in these three 
countries by compensating on the basis of aggregate farm household income (inclusive of 
off-farm income). 
Farm income compensation at the level of a representative farm household in each 
of these countries leads to sizable increases in WTO green-box outlays in each country. 
In Japan, agricultural land is subject to net taxation in the initial situation, and 
compensation requires a change to net subsidization at the level of $9.1 billion in land-
based payments. Both the EU and US have significant land-based payments initially and 
the compensation scheme here indicates that the EU would need a 63 percent increase 
over that initial level at a cost of $11.8 billion. For the US, the percentage increase is 
smaller at 27.4%, coming at a cost of $3.3 billion. 
  As discussed previously, the use of farm income as a welfare indicator for the 
population of farm households in wealthy countries is incomplete and in this case would 
lead to considerable over-compensation in welfare terms. Using the full farm household 
welfare criterion as opposed to solely farm income, we find that Japanese and US policy-
makers need only compensate these farmers with $6.3 billion and $2.4 billion dollars, 
nearly a one-third reduction. The reduction in the European Union is much smaller (only 
$300 million less than when compensating based on losses in farm income alone). This 
follows directly from the relatively large share of income from farming in the European 
Union (60 percent) as well as the less favorable developments in off-farm income. 
Conclusions   
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  This paper has sought to identify the impacts of WTO reforms on farm 
households in rich and poor countries. It has done so via innovative use of newly 
available household survey data that identify the income sources and degree of earnings 
specialization of households. This proves to be a critical factor in assessing the household 
welfare impacts of trade reforms. In the rich countries, we focus our attention on the 
United States, where survey data permit us to assess the impacts of trade reforms by 
wealth decile and commodity specialization. In the poor countries, we focus our attention 
on the poverty headcount – among both farm and non-farm households.  
  Our findings highlight the fact that wealthy farmers are the main beneficiaries of 
current trade policies aimed at protecting agriculture in the rich countries. Furthermore, 
these benefits tend to be concentrated in a few products that receive very high levels of 
support presently. In the United States, rice stands out – followed by cotton, sugar and 
dairy. When we look at aggregate farm household welfare in the United States, it is little 
affected by agricultural trade policy reforms. This is because many of the farm products 
receive little or no support and improved market access in other countries benefits export-
oriented producers. Indeed, this is why the average farm household in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand is expected to gain from rich country agricultural trade reforms. A 
second reason why the average farm household in the US is not more severely affected 
by trade policy reform stems from the degree of earnings diversification in that country. 
On average, only 8% of farm household income in the US is derived from farming. This 
income diversification is also critical in Japan where just 12% of farm income is obtained 
from on-farm earnings. As a consequence, while Doha trade reforms cause on-farm 
incomes to drop by 16% in Japan, the average farm household impact is just 1.4%.   
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  This finding of generally modest impacts on the average farm household stands in 
sharp contrast to the strong opposition from agricultural lobbies in the rich countries. This 
opposition can be better understood when we use our household survey data for the US to 
show that the degree of earnings diversification diminishes for the wealthiest farms in the 
highly protected commodities, and this provides them with strong incentives to prevent 
the very substantial drop in household welfare that can be expected under trade reform. 
Consequently, we can expect that some compensation mechanism is necessary to solve 
the political impasse currently plaguing the Doha talks. We explore one such mechanism 
by which payments are aimed at neutralizing the loss in average on-farm income for each 
commodity group. This program would introduce around $25 billion of new agricultural 
subsidies into global agriculture from the three countries where farm income declines 
(Japan, EU, and US) and would likely make the Doha scenario much more palatable to 
the farm lobbies.  
  In the poorest countries, we find that, with one minor exception, rich country 
agriculture reforms benefit low-income farm households. Regardless of the poverty line 
considered, the poverty headcount in this part of the developing world falls. However, the 
impact on non-farm population groups is mixed. In those countries where agriculture 
makes up a large share of the unskilled labor force, rich country reforms tend to increase 
the demand for labor sufficiently to benefit unskilled workers throughout the economy. 
However, self-employed households in the non-agricultural economy, as well as those 
dependent on transfer payments, systematically lose. Therefore the national poverty 
outcome inevitably depends on the relative weights of these different groups in the 
national poverty picture. Since a large share of the poor reside in agriculture, national  
  40
poverty falls in two-thirds of the focus countries in the wake of rich country agricultural 
liberalization.  
  Finally, we conclude that, if policy makers are serious about poverty reduction, 
they should push for more poor country farm and food tariff cuts, as these products loom 
large in the household budgets of the poor. Giving them access to food at world market 
prices (adjusted for marketing margins) is a sure way to reduce poverty. Yet this is 
precisely the component that is mostly omitted under the current Doha proposals. Indeed, 
global trade liberalization is the policy configuration with the most favorable poverty 
outcomes in the 15 developing countries examined in this study.  
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Table 1. US Farm Income Shares by Household Type and Wealth Group 
Wealth Group  Rice  Sugar  Cotton  Dairy  Other 
10-%ile 0.39  0.22  0.67  0.56  -0.01 
20-%ile 0.39  0.22  0.67  0.47  0.03 
30-%ile 0.58  0.22  0.75  0.72  0.01 
40-%ile 0.58  0.78  0.64  0.48  -0.01 
50-%ile 0.84  0.78  0.82  0.59  0.07 
60-%ile 0.55  0.78  0.59  0.57  0.07 
70-%ile 0.76  0.31  0.64  0.71  0.11 
80-%ile 0.80  0.31  0.63  0.61  0.12 
90-%ile 0.75  0.66  0.83  0.81  0.20 
95-%ile 0.74  0.91  0.68  0.83  0.21 
100-%ile 0.74  0.91  0.91  0.92  0.41 
Source: 2004 USDA-ERS ARMS. 
  
 
Table 2. Stratum Contributions to the $1/day Poverty Population in each Country 
Strata 






Labor  Transfer  Urban 
Diverse 
Rural 
Diverse  Total 
Bangladesh   0.15 0.13  0.04  0.22  0.03 0.07 0.37  1.00 
Brazil   0.14 0.09  0.24  0.15  0.32 0.04 0.03  1.00 
Chile   0.26 0.01  0.09  0.09  0.28 0.15 0.12  1.00 
Colombia   0.28 0.43  0.03  0.04  0.12 0.05 0.04  1.00 
Indonesia   0.42 0.12  0.02  0.07  0.04 0.06 0.28  1.00 
Malawi   0.54 0.11  0.00  0.03  0.07 0.01 0.25  1.00 
Mexico   0.05 0.06  0.05  0.12  0.28 0.14 0.29  1.00 
Mozambique   0.41 0.13  0.01  0.05  0.14 0.06 0.19  1.00 
Peru   0.07 0.35  0.01  0.02  0.22 0.11 0.23  1.00 
Philippines   0.12 0.06  0.03  0.05  0.03 0.23 0.49  1.00 
Thailand   0.06 0.02  0.00  0.06  0.11 0.07 0.68  1.00 
Uganda   0.10 0.04  0.00  0.03  0.02 0.07 0.75  1.00 
Venezuela   0.08 0.24  0.17  0.10  0.28 0.08 0.05  1.00 
Vietnam   0.04 0.11  0.00  0.00  0.05 0.10 0.70  1.00 
Zambia   0.34 0.23  0.10  0.07  0.07 0.09 0.11  1.00 
Source: Household surveys for each country.  
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Table 3. Elasticity of Poverty Headcount ($1/day) with Respect to Total Income 
Strata 









Bangladesh   1.64  2.02  1.58  0.63  0.56  1.74  1.09 
Brazil   0.75  1.28  1.94  2.19  0.34  3.63  2.69 
Chile   1.90  2.24  2.06  1.55  2.45  2.29  2.60 
Colombia   0.79  0.60  1.73  1.72  0.93  1.14  1.00 
Indonesia   2.35  2.14  2.38  2.89  1.17  2.58  2.87 
Malawi   0.49  0.30  2.26  1.97  0.43  1.04  0.76 
Mexico   1.73  1.90  3.33  2.08  2.28  1.63  1.80 
Mozambique   0.28  0.94  0.97  0.76  0.48  1.58  0.99 
Peru   1.50  1.32  2.37  1.73  0.44  1.09  1.05 
Philippines   2.25  1.96  2.98  2.44  1.69  2.42  1.98 
Thailand   2.30  2.42  2.98  2.45  2.78  2.42  2.59 
Uganda   0.28  0.40  1.71  0.34  0.01  0.36  0.21 
Venezuela   0.69  1.16  2.57  2.17  0.01  1.72  1.53 
Vietnam   0.48  1.12  2.81  8.98  0.84  0.86  1.01 
Zambia   0.00  0.64  2.28  0.91  0.45  1.29  0.37 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household survey data.  
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Table 4. Poverty Elasticities, by Stratum and Income Source, $1/day: Peru 
 Factor  Agriculture  Non-
Agriculture 
Urban 








1.41 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.21 
Ag. Skilled 
















0.00 0.00  0.16  0.12  0.00  0.01  0.00 
Agricultural 




0.00 0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.12 
Transfers 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.44  0.18  0.15 
Total 1.50  1.32  2.37  1.73  0.44  1.09  1.05 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household survey data.  
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Table 5. Poverty Elasticities for Rural Diversified Stratum, $1/day 


























Bangladesh  0.01  0.18 0.00  0.20 0.00  0.43 0.04  0.01  0.03  0.10  1.00 
Brazil  0.00  0.10 0.04  0.12 0.00  0.32 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.41  1.00 
Chile  0.05  0.16 0.00  0.02 0.00  0.35 0.00  0.07  0.00  0.35  1.00 
Colombia 0.00 0.22  0.00 0.30  0.00 0.22  0.02  0.00  0.02 0.21  1.00 
Indonesia  0.06  0.32 0.00  0.20 0.00  0.26 0.00  0.04  0.08  0.04  1.00 
Malawi  0.03  0.38 0.00  0.07 0.00  0.08 0.00  0.06  0.11  0.27  1.00 
Mexico  0.01  0.14 0.00  0.06 0.00  0.48 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.30  1.00 
Mozambique  0.01  0.43 0.00  0.07 0.00  0.07 0.00  0.02  0.20  0.20  1.00 
Peru  0.02  0.20 0.00  0.30 0.07  0.13 0.00  0.03  0.11  0.14  1.00 
Phillippines  0.22  0.00 0.02  0.14 0.01  0.30 0.01  0.12  0.08  0.11  1.00 
Thailand  0.04  0.21 0.03  0.03 0.01  0.24 0.07  0.02  0.02  0.35  1.00 
Uganda  0.14  0.15 0.00  0.06 0.00  0.09 0.06  0.26  0.14  0.10  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.10 0.00  0.32 0.01  0.28 0.04  0.00  0.00  0.26  1.00 
Vietnam  0.01  0.09 0.00  0.14 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.55  0.21  1.00 
Zambia  0.01  0.03 0.00  0.20 0.00  0.43 0.05  0.03  0.13  0.12  1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household survey data. 
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Table 6. Overview of Scenarios 
  Rich Agriculture  Global 
(All countries and merchandise)  
Instrument Doha  Full  Doha  Full 
Agr. Tariffs  Rich  -45 %, -70 %, -75 %
c  -100 %  -45 %, -70%, -75 %  -100 % 
Agr. Tariffs 
Poor (Non-LDC
a)  n.a.  n.a.  -35%, -40%, -50%, -60%
d   -100 % 




-75 % Group 1 
-60 % Group 2  -100 %  -75 % Group 1 
-60 % Group 2  -100 % 
Non-Agr. Tariffs Rich  n.a.  n.a.  -50%  -100 % 
Non-Agr. Tariffs Poor 
(Non-LDC
a)  n.a.  n.a.  -33 %   -100 % 
Green Box Subsidies  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
aLeast developed countries are not required to make any tariff reductions under Doha scenarios. 
bGroup 1 countries have amber box subsidies accounting for more than 20% of producer revenue. Group 2 countries 
have support less than 20 percent of producer revenue. A third grouping exists for developing countries where 40 
percent reductions are required, but adequate data on amber box subsidies is available to model this. 
cThese three percentage cuts are applied in a tiered formula whereby higher portions of the tariff are more deeply cut. 
Tiers are defined over the tariff rate and the reductions increase at 15% and then  90%. 
dThese four percentage cuts are applied in a tiered formula whereby higher potions of the tariff are more deeply cut. 
Tiers are defined over the tariff rate and the reductions increase at 20%, 60%, and 120%. 
Table 7. Welfare and Terms of Trade Results 
  Rich Agriculture  Global 
(All countries and merchandise) 




  ToT Welfare  ToT Welfare ToT Welfare ToT Welfare
Rich Countries            
Aust. and 
New Zlnd.  2.79 0.72  1.09 0.25  2.30 0.76  1.09 0.28 
Japan  -1.32 0.96  -0.38 0.44  0.28 1.29  0.04 0.54 
Canada  -0.07 0.27  -0.02 0.10  -0.64 0.39  -0.23 0.06 
US  0.36 0.02  0.13 0.01  0.29 0.06  0.01 0.01 
Europe  FTA  -0.30 0.21  -0.06 0.18  -0.12 0.42  -0.12 0.20 
Focus Countries            
Bangladesh  -0.58 -0.27  -0.21 -0.10  -5.66 -0.65  -0.04 -0.04 
Brazil  5.48 0.75  1.91 0.26  3.72 0.67  2.03 0.31 
Chile  0.74 0.13  0.15 0.01  0.58 0.32  0.18 0.01 
Colombia 1.27  0.00
# 0.60  0.01  -1.52 -0.54 0.33  -0.07  
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Indonesia -0.23  -0.26  -0.10  -0.09  1.11  0.51  0.23  0.07 
Malawi  2.67 1.92  0.18 0.22  3.56 3.83  0.34 0.32 
Mexico -0.14
# -0.25  -0.11 -0.08  -2.02 -0.20  -0.43 -0.12 
Mozambique -0.39 -0.54  -0.15 -0.14 0.00  1.19  -0.13 -0.08 
Peru 3.47  0.58  0.16  -0.01  0.66  0.60  0.11  -0.02 
Philippines 0.01
# -0.21  -0.08 -0.11  -0.33  0.49 0.12  0.12 
Tanzania 0.04
# -0.08  -0.21 -0.08  -2.05 -0.66  -0.29 -0.08 
Thailand  1.21 0.77  0.24 0.15  1.50 2.08  0.54 0.51 
Uganda  -0.50 -0.21  -0.63 -0.18  -0.99 -0.32  -0.64 -0.18 
Venezuela  -0.41 -0.11  -0.23 -0.06  -2.19 -0.26  -0.68 -0.03 
Vietnam 0.34  0.12
# -0.12  -0.18 -1.25  5.73 -0.85  -1.17 
Zambia  -0.17 -0.20  -0.01 -0.05  -0.46  0.28 0.04 -0.03 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level. 
aSensitivity analysis is not conducted for these liberalization simulations.  
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Table 8. Percent Change in Farm Income for Rich Regions by Source (On/Off-Farm) 
Rich Region Doha Ag. Reforms  Rich Region Ag. Full Reform 




7.3 -0.0  4.4  17.3  -0.0
# 10.5 
Japan -15.5  0.6  -1.4  -28.2  1.2  -2.5 
Canada  3.5 0.0  0.4  6.3 0.1 0.7 




-5.8 0.3  -3.5  -12.7 0.5  -7.7 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level. 
 
 
Table 9. Disaggregate U.S. Farm Household Income Impacts of Ag. Reforms 
Rice Hhld.  Sugar Hhld.  Cotton Hhld.  Dairy Hhld.  Other Hhld.  Income 
Group  Doha  Full Doha Full Doha  Full Doha Full Doha Full 
10%ile  1.36  -5.08 -0.12  -0.97 -2.09 -8.31 -0.30  -2.44  0.02 0.08 
20%ile  1.37  -5.11 -0.12  -0.97 -2.09 -8.31 -0.30  -2.00 -0.03  -0.12 
30%ile  1.89  -6.55 -0.34  -2.64 -1.63 -7.03 -0.43  -2.94  0.00  0.00
# 
40%ile  1.89  -6.57 -0.87  -4.80 -2.13 -8.14 -0.32  -2.11  0.01 0.08 
50%ile  6.32  -16.63 -0.87  -4.80 -1.60 -7.64 -0.41  -2.56 -0.08  -0.35 
60%ile  1.63  -7.68 -0.87  -4.80 -1.18 -5.00 -0.44  -2.74 -0.08  -0.34 
70%ile  4.64  -14.92 -0.37  -1.98 -1.47 -6.66 -0.66  -3.74 -0.17  -0.70 
80%ile  5.53  -17.08 -0.37  -1.98 -1.15 -5.13 -0.47  -2.92 -0.18  -0.78 
90%ile  5.60  -17.79 -0.65  -3.73 -1.81 -8.94 -0.71  -4.26 -0.31  -1.31 
95%ile  5.33  -18.91 -1.33  -6.49 -1.61 -6.77 -0.46  -3.56 -0.30  -1.31 
100%ile  5.31  -18.83 -1.33  -6.49 -3.53  -12.68 -0.50  -4.04 -0.56  -2.39 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level.  
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Table 10. Percentage Change in Cost of Living Adjusted Factor Returns: $1/day Poverty  
Country Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  NagUnskl  NagSkl WgUnskl WgSkl AgCap NagCap Transfer 
Bangladesh  1.64 0.77  0.57 -0.38  -0.46  -0.06
# -0.46  0.53  -0.55  -0.33 
Brazil  39.28 16.06  14.73  -1.68  -1.99  0.46  -1.82  14.63 -2.31 -0.69 
Chile  12.55 6.13  5.44 -0.96  -1.19 0.12  -1.18  5.42  -1.29  -0.72 
Colombia  9.75 4.41  3.74 -1.70  -1.84 -0.58  -1.84  3.68  -2.19  -1.13 
Indonesia  2.56 1.22  0.81 -0.75  -0.95 -0.12  -0.94  0.82  -0.94  -0.57 
Malawi  1.78 1.37  1.13  0.78  0.53 1.02  0.54  1.22  0.61 1.35 
Mexico  16.73
# 4.82  4.13 -1.20  -1.50  -0.18
# -1.50  4.13  -1.60  -1.11 
Mozambique  1.38 0.51  0.31 -0.61  -0.65 -0.26  -0.64  0.32
# -0.72 -0.46 
Peru  14.61 7.90  6.34 -1.53  -1.88 1.30  -1.61  6.19  -2.05  -0.71 
Philippines  2.20 1.07  0.65 -0.79  -0.90  -0.03
# -0.86  0.54  -1.16  -0.57 
Thailand  22.67 10.93  8.28  -1.66  -2.70  2.41  -2.42 7.83 -3.27 -1.27 
Uganda  -0.14
# -0.16  -0.19  -0.15  -0.22 -0.16  -0.22  -0.18  -0.21 -0.19 
Venezuela  2.02 0.90  0.78 -0.39  -0.43 -0.20  -0.43  0.79  -0.45  -0.33 
Vietnam  4.23 2.03  1.61 -0.66  -0.86  -0.04
# -0.86  1.68  -0.76  -0.32 
Zambia  1.56 0.75  0.60 -0.32  -0.38 -0.07  -0.38  0.59  -0.54  -0.21 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level. 
Note: All earnings have been deflated by the country-specific cost of living at the poverty line.  
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Table 11. Percent Change in the Poverty Headcount ($1/day) across Developing Country 
Stratums, when Rich Countries undertake Full Agricultural Reform 
Country  Agriculture  Non-
Agriculture 
Urban 




Bangladesh -1.27 0.78  0.09
# 0.05  0.18  -0.05
# 0.02
# 
Brazil -10.45  2.21  -0.57
# -0.79 0.23  -7.10  -4.81 
Chile -12.53  2.24  -0.22
# -0.14
# 1.78  -4.65  -4.25 
Colombia  -3.37 1.04 1.04 1.03  1.06  0.13
# 0.01
# 
Indonesia  -2.86 1.62 0.45 0.46  0.66  -0.56  -0.80 
Malawi  -0.67 -0.22 -2.10 -1.88  -0.57  -1.20  -0.92 
Mexico -7.83  2.35  0.77  0.37
# 2.57  -0.29
# -0.52
# 
Mozambique  -0.15 0.62 0.25 0.20  0.22  0.21  0.06
# 
Peru  -10.83  2.14 -2.53 -1.82 0.32  -1.61  -1.32 
Philippines -3.52 1.68  0.22
# 0.15
# 0.97  -0.55  -0.54 
Thailand  -22.04  4.35 -6.68 -5.49 3.43  -7.69  -7.90 
Uganda  0.05 0.07 0.34 0.06  0.00  0.06  0.04 
Venezuela  -0.61 0.45 0.54 0.46  0.00  0.37  0.31 
Vietnam -0.99  0.78  0.13
# 1.87  0.26  -0.64  0.36 
Zambia  0.00 0.26 0.40 0.12  0.09  0.19  0.06 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level.  
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Table 12. National Poverty Impacts due to Rich Country Liberalization of Agriculture: Full 
versus Doha
a Reform 
Rich Agriculture Full Reform  Rich Agriculture Doha Reform 
 $1/day          $2/day         $1/day         $2/day 
Country  % 1000s  % 1000s  % 1000s  % 1000s 
Bangladesh  -0.06
#  -27
#  0.06  62 0.00  0 0.02  21
Brazil -1.88  -431  -2.61  -958 -0.73  -167 -0.96  -352
Chile -3.99  -12  -2.48  -35 -0.99  -3 -0.57  -8
Colombia -0.29  -12  -0.67  -59 -0.17  -7 -0.46  -40
Indonesia -1.18  -177  -0.20  -210 -0.13  -20 0.00  0
Malawi -0.72  -31  -0.32  -25 0.41  17 0.15  12
Mexico 0.34  32  -0.10  -25 0.15  14 0.03  7
Mozambique 0.09  5  0.06  8 0.05  3 0.02  3
Peru -0.43  -19  -1.71  -157 0.04  2 -0.18  -17
Philippines -0.66  -75  -0.41  -143 0.03  3 0.00  0
Thailand -7.10 -84  -4.15  -806 -1.43  -17 -0.83  -161
Uganda 0.04 7  1.12  220 0.04  7 1.58   310
Venezuela 0.24  8  0.18  13 0.11  4 0.09  6
Vietnam 0.25 4  -0.24  -62 0.14  2 0.12  31
Zambia 0.13  8  0.03  2 0.03  2 0.01  1
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
# Result can not be distinguished from zero change at the 95% confidence level. 



















Bangladesh  0.29 -0.11 -0.05 -0.18  0.62 
Brazil  -1.42 -1.79 -0.07 -0.15  0.60 
Chile  -4.99 -3.89  0.00 -1.41  0.31 
Colombia  0.10 -0.29 -0.04 -0.28  0.71 
Indonesia  -1.45 -1.24 -0.46 -0.82  1.07 
Malawi  -1.84 -0.74  0.02 -0.96 -0.16 
Mexico  1.35 0.31 0.31 0.61 0.12 
Mozambique  -0.69 0.07 0.04  -1.08 0.28 
Peru  -0.80 -0.40  0.03 -0.23 -0.19 
Philippines  -0.76 -0.76 -0.70 -0.56  1.27 
Thailand  -8.87 -6.63 -0.53 -4.55  2.84 
Uganda  0.07 0.04 0.00  -0.06 0.08 
Venezuela  0.85 0.26 0.05  -0.15 0.70 
Vietnam  -5.85  0.22 -1.84 -1.70 -2.53 
Zambia  0.09 0.14 0.05  -0.29 0.19 







Table 14. Change in National Poverty due to Global Liberalization: Doha versus Full
a 
Global Liberalization  Global Doha Liberalization 
$1/day $2/day  $1/day  $2/day 
Country  % 1000s %  1000s  %  1000s  %  1000s 
Bangladesh 0.29  130  0.13  133  -0.05 -22  0.01  10 
Brazil -1.42  -325  -1.73  -635  -0.79  -181  -1.09  -400 
Chile -4.99  -15  -3.26  -46  -1.28  -4  -0.76  -11 
Colombia 0.10  4  1.20  105  -0.09  -4  -0.13  -11 
Indonesia -1.45  -218  -0.59  -619  -0.20  -30  -0.09  -94 
Malawi -1.84  -78  -0.77  -60  0.35  15  0.12  9 
Mexico 1.35  125  0.67  166  0.13  12  0.03  7 
Mozambique -0.69  -42 -0.30  -38  0.02  1  0.01  1 
Peru -0.80  -35  -1.87  -172  0.06  3  -0.15  -14 
Philippines -0.76  -86  -0.19 -66  -0.25 -28  -0.12 -42 
Thailand -8.87  -105  -4.49  -872  -1.97  -23  -1.02  -198 
Uganda 0.07  12  2.19  430  0.04  7  1.58  310 
Venezuela 0.85  28  0.78 54  0.21  7  0.18  13 
Vietnam -5.85  -90  -4.84  -1242  0.89  14  0.70  180 
Zambia 0.09  5  0.03  2  0.03  2  0.01  1 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 








Figure 2.  Total poverty Rate versus Poverty Rate among Agricultural Specialized households 
(line denotes locus of points with equal poverty rates) 
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 